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Abstract.  We describe some more recent developments of the SPoC system. We 
describe a new module in the occam compiler which performs substantial 
simplifications of the run-time demands made by the compiled code. This has been 
used successfully both to target a simple PIC microcontroller and to generate input 
for the SMV model checker. 
1.  Introduction 
The initial development of the SPoC occam compilation system was reported[1] at a 
previous conference of this series. This is a robust programming environment, suitable for 
commercial code development. In its original form, it accepted the occam 2.5 programming 
language and converted a complete parallel occam program into a single program in the C 
programming language. A simple scheduler implemented within the C code allows the 
execution of the parallel occam program by the cooperative sequencing of the various 
program fragments. No operating system support for multithreading or concurrency is 
required. The resultant code is highly portable and has run on big- and little-endian 
processors, UNIX and Microsoft operating systems and dedicated signal processors. 
Macros for the gdb debugger permit the debugging of running programs at the occam 
source level. Additional experimental versions of SPoC have supported distributed 
message-passing architectures, allcache shared memory systems, dynamic remote process 
creation and channel migration.  
Despite its wide application, there were two key application areas for which SPoC was 
not entirely suitable: microcontrollers and model checking. In both cases, this was because 
the domain required that the run-time support demands be even “lighter” than for SPoC. In 
the case of the microcontrollers, the burning need was to minimise the amount of run-time 
state and thus of RAM required for an occam program; a 16F84[2] has only 36 bytes of 
data storage and 1024 words of instruction storage. For model checking, not only did the 168  D. A. Nicole et al. / occam for Reliable Embedded Systems 
amount of run-time state have to be minimised to reduce the amount of checking to a 
reasonable level, but the restricted execution model of mainstream model checkers had to 
be targeted. Newer version of the PIC, such as the 16F628, relax the memory constraints 
considerably; the increase in data memory to 224 bytes is particularly welcome. 
We believe we have achieved a reasonable degree of success in tackling both these 
domains; perhaps one of our key achievements has been to eliminate the learning curve for 
both targets. The occam programmer is able to perform interesting model checking entirely 
at the occam level, with no need to learn either a FSM description language or the handling 
of temporal logic expressions. 
2.  The occam simplifier 
In addition to their limited memory, the PIC microcontrollers have only a restricted stack 
depth for subroutine return addresses. A module for SPoC was developed which performed 
a variety of standard compile-time optimizations: 
1.  Elimination of SKIP processes. 
2.  Constant propagation and elimination of unreachable IF and CASE processes. 
3.  Replicator unrolling. In occam, PAR replicators are always constant, as are many 
ALT, IF and SEQ counts. Elimination of these explicit replicators greatly simplifies 
the run-time and allows many new opportunities for constant propagation. This 
unrolling is essential to reduce the amount of run-time state exposed to the PIC. 
4.  Function and procedure inlining. Occam has a very clean copy-in copy-out semantics 
for procedure parameters and thus inlining, even in the presence of free variables, is 
relatively straightforward. Again, this gives additional opportunities for constant 
propagation and dead code elimination. 
5.  Array inlining. Traditional array indexing imposes unacceptable demands on the PIC 
architecture. Not only is array indexing awkward to code, the manipulation of 
interesting arrays is incompatible with the PIC’s very small data store. The compiler 
thus eliminates all array references, replacing them as necessary with generated 
scalar variables. 
As is typical with an optimizing compiler, the various optimizations interact strongly 
and multiple passes through the optimizer are required to realize all the benefits of the 
simplifications. It will be seen that many of the optimizations have the effect of reducing 
run-time dynamic state (array indexes, loop counters, subroutine stacks, at the expense of 
increasing the code size. This is a fortuitous combination as for both microcontrollers and 
model checkers, the code length (or model size) is not normally a limiting factor; the 
dynamic state, on the other hand, is strongly restricted. The reader should also note that 
occam would support even more aggressive optimizations; it is, for example possible to 
remove[3] almost all the parallelism and internal channels from an occam code. 
3.  The PIC run-time 
There are a variety of obvious simplifications for the PIC. Firstly, floating-point arithmetic 
makes little sense on such a simple architecture and all support for floating point is 
dropped. Similarly, INTs are configured as sixteen bit. INT32 and INT64 are, however, 
supported although little used. Another occam feature which is expensive on the PIC is 
overflow detection for integer arithmetic. This is supported by default, but a compiler 
option allows the support to be removed, improving code performance. Multiplication is 
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fixed memory locations, is used to perform multiplies in software. This is against the 
inlining philosophy of the compiler, but the considerable size of the multiply code 
precludes its inlining. Division is currently not supported. 
As noted earlier, replicated PARs are unrolled by the optimizer. We still need, however, 
to maintain state to manage the join at the end of the PAR block; this takes up one byte in 
memory. The process scheduler uses one bit per deschedule point to indicate which code 
blocks are runnable; when the running process becomes blocked, the scheduler searches 
these bits for another runnable code block.  
Channels are implemented as one bit per out (!) process; an inputting (?) process scans 
the out bits to find a runnable transfer. ALTs offer no special problems here although this 
does effectively result in a polling implementation  ALT. 
Proper support for timers and ports in the compiler makes it easy to write a 
demonstration code which will, say, flash several LEDs at different rates or implement full 
duplex serial communications. 
4.  Model checking 
Model checking has become a preferred technique among researchers for assuring the 
correctness of concurrent hardware or software systems. In short, a complex system is built 
from a set of interacting finite state machines. An exhaustive simulation is then performed 
of all possible histories for the complex system. In each state of each history, the property 
under test is evaluated. The model checker can then report whether the property can ever be 
violated and, usefully, can directly emit a shortest history to a violation. It is essential in 
standard model checkers that the number of possible states (instantaneous configurations) 
of the system be finite; furthermore the complexity of the model checking run grows 
rapidly with the size of this state.  
There are several commercial-grade model checkers available to the programming 
community. Well-known ones include SMV[4,5], SPIN[6] and FDR[7]. These are 
remarkably efficient programs but are not yet taken up widely in industry. Perhaps the main 
obstruction to their adoption is the substantial semantic-gap between programming 
languages and model-checker input. The issues here are by no means as dramatic as with, 
say, proof systems, but are nevertheless substantial for the working programmer. The 
program typically has to be rendered from C, Java or occam source into a wholly alien 
state-machine representation. Furthermore, the property under test has to be described in a 
form of temporal logic: a predicate calculus with a few extra quantifiers. These two foreign 
languages are enough to deter all but the most persistent programmers. An alternative 
formulation of model checking tests whether one program is a refinement of another (i.e. 
has a lower degree of nondeterminism); this is hardly easier to explain to the typical 
programmer. 
Fortunately, there are ways to de-skill both the key steps in setting up a model checker. 
First, we can directly check the program in its high level language. There are clearly 
potential problems here; the variables in a typical program imply a great deal of state. Thus 
it is normally necessary to simplify the program under test by only tracking the variables 
which are essential to the property being tested; this is a form of program slicing. This 
simplification does not damage the reliability of the model check; wherever an untracked 
variable is used in, say, an IF test, its value is treated as undetermined and both branches of 
the test are explored. Thus the model checker is always pessimistic; if insufficient variables 
are tracked, then the check gives a false failure, never a false success.  
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isolation with a check in an environment. For occam, we just join the external channels up 
to another occam program representing the environment. Then we typically need only two 
tests: 
1.  Safety properties are tested by checking if an error state can ever be reached. 
2.  Liveness properties are tested by checking if deadlock (STOP) can ever be 
reached. 
We do not explicitly treat fairness. Ideas of weak fairness add a great deal of complexity 
to models of concurrency. We instead take the aggressive view that, for real-time codes, 
failure of any component to make progress within a fixed and finite number of ticks 
represents failure and causes a transition to the error state. 
5.  A model checking example: LTSA 
The LTSA[8, 9] model checker is especially designed as a simple introduction to the 
technology. It is easy to use and can be run as an applet over the World Wide Web. A very 
simple example of its use gives some indication of what can easily be achieved, and where 
problems arise. Let us try to evaluate the correctness of the following code which purports 
to offer mutual exclusion between two threads. We define a turn variable: 
    int turn = 1; 
and in each thread (me=0, 1 respectively), we guard the critical section as follows: 
    while (turn != me);   
    /* loop waiting for my turn */ 
    /* CRITICAL SECTION */ 
    turn = 1- me; 
We model this system in LTSA’s FSP language as the parallel composition of three 
machines, representing the turn variable and the two threads which share it: 
TURN1 = (set0->TURN1|unset1->TURN0|isset1->TURN1), 
TURN0 = (set0->TURN1|unset1->TURN0|isunset0->TURN0). 
P0 = (isunset0-> claim0 -> release0-> set0->P0). 
P1 = (isunset1-> claim1 -> release1-> unset1->P1). 
||SYS=(TURN1||P0||P1). 
This does not look much like the original C. Note also that we have replaced a busy 
polling implementation with a non-busy one. We have included claim and release 
transitions so that we can join up an environment which ensures that claims and releases 
can take place only in the permitted order. This new system, which checks the safety 
property of this mutex becomes: 
TURN1 = (set0->TURN1|unset1->TURN0|isset1->TURN1), 
TURN0 = (set0->TURN1|unset1->TURN0|isunset0->TURN0). 
P0 = (isunset0-> claim0 -> release0-> set0->P0). 
P1 = (isset1-> claim1 -> release1-> unset1->P1). 
property MUTEX=(claim0->release0->MUTEX|claim1->release1->MUTEX). 
||SYS=(TURN1||P0||P1||MUTEX). 
Here the property keyword is a shorthand which adds extra transitions into an error 
state from all states on all events in the vocabulary of mutex which are not explicitly given 
transitions to other states. Thus the explicit transitions of mutex become the only safe 
transitions which the machine should accept. This system is accepted by LTSA as being 
without error or deadlock, so the safety property is true; the example is a mutex.  
We can go on to check a liveness property. We require that the mutex be able to offer 
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which makes an internal choice about which thread will request the mutex. Possible 
deadlock would imply that the mutex fails to accept this imposed choice. In occam, such 
internal choice is easy to express; we just use an ALT with two SKIP guards. It’s a bit 
trickier in LTSA; we need to represent in the LTSA language an ALT with two inputs on 
the same channel, then hide this spurious channel. In FSP, we get: 
TURN1 = (set0->TURN1|unset1->TURN0|isset1->TURN1), 
TURN0 = (set0->TURN1|unset1->TURN0|isunset0->TURN0). 
P0 = (isunset0-> claim0 -> release0-> set0->P0). 
P1 = (isset1-> claim1 -> release1-> unset1->P1). 
EXT = (t->claim0->release0->EXT|t->claim1->release1->EXT)\{t}. 
||SYS=(TURN1||P0||P1||EXT). 
 
As the reader might expect, LTSA reports a deadlock when presented with this input; 
our crude mutex actually forces strict alternation and to do better we need Peterson’s[10] 
algorithm. 
So what has been learnt? First, crude tests (no temporal logic) are entirely adequate to 
test both safety and liveness. Second, even simple tutorial model checkers have an alien 
input language. Finally, occam is at least as expressive as FSP both for the system under 
test and for its environments. 
LTSA is a very attractive system for learning about model checking. Checking software 
is, however, an intensive task and it is not appropriate to use a visual learning tool for this 
purpose. Production-quality model checkers are readily available [5,6,7]; SMV makes a 
good choice as it has been adopted by Cadence, thus improving our chances in the future of 
model checking across the hardware-software boundary. 
6.  Model checking occam 
We have chosen to implement the model check as a new back-end for SPoC. This makes 
heavy use of the optimiser developed for the PIC back-end to simplify the generated SMV 
code and to reduce the amount of program state. As explained above, it is necessary to 
annotate the occam program with compiler directives to indicate which variables are to be 
tracked by SMV. This is done by introducing directives of the form 
  #PRAGMA TRACK x 0::10  
into the occam source. This directive not only requests the tracking of variable x, it also 
asserts that x has range 0 ≤ x ≤ 10. A violation of this range assertion will be flagged as an 
error by SMV. The generated SMV code is remarkably similar to that for the PIC in overall 
structure. For example, the runnable bits associated with code fragments on the PIC are 
simply combined to give a program counter per concurrent thread which increments only at 
deschedule points. The implementation of ALT depends on the version of SMV that is in 
use. There is a simple version for Cadence Berkeley SMV which uses guarded set 
expressions. Unfortunately, this version is not open source, and a rather more complex 
implementation with potentially many cases has to be used with Carnegie-Mellon’s open 
source SMV. 
As well as generating the SMV code for the model check, it is important that, in the 
event of failure of the check, the SMV history of the failure can be rendered in language the 
occam programmer can understand. This back annotation of SMV state into occam state is 
handled by a Perl script which maps the SMV program counters back into occam source 
lines. This trace history can then be followed to the failure. Information to drive this script 
is generated by SPoC. By default the model checker tests the Temporal Logic (CTL) 172  D. A. Nicole et al. / occam for Reliable Embedded Systems 
expression 
AG AF termination 
This expresses in temporal logic the assertion that the occam program will terminate. 
Deadlock and most forms of livelock will have the effect of making this test fail.  
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